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ABSTRACT 
This article describes experiences and lessons learned from the 
Trusted CI project, funded by the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) to serve the community as the NSF Cybersecurity Center of 
Excellence (CCoE). Trusted CI is an effort to address cybersecurity 
for the open science community through a single organization that 
provides leadership, training, consulting, and knowledge to that 
community. The article describes the experiences and lessons 
learned of Trusted CI regarding both cybersecurity for open science 
and managing the process of providing centralized services to a 
broad and diverse community. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and privacy → Distributed systems security 
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INTRODUCTION 
Science projects manage many risks to their mission of 
reproducible, trustworthy, and productive science. One source of 
mission risk is typically managed by cybersecurity, e.g., the risk of 
malicious entities attacking IT infrastructure to further their own 
ends at the expense of legitimate users or explicitly harming those 
users. The open science community, with its relatively low need for 
confidentiality, has traditionally been less concerned with 
cybersecurity than other communities, such as financial services or 
medical research. But increasing trends in hacktivism, the 
politicization of science, and the ability of attackers to monetize 
data of any sort (via “Ransomware”) mean that open science 
projects are not immune to attack.  
This article describes the experiences of Trusted CI, a project 
initially funded by the National Science Foundation in 2012 and 
later designated as the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 
(CCoE) in 2015. In 2019, Trusted CI is in its seventh year with an 
objective to address cybersecurity for the United States National 
Science Foundation (NSF) community, a subset of the global open 
science community, through a single (virtual) organization that 
provides training, consulting, and knowledge to that community. 
Trusted CI also represents a model for providing a specialized skill, 
cybersecurity, through a centralized organization focused on that 
skill to serve the whole community. Similar organizations include 
the UK Software Sustainability Institute [1], the NSF Software 
Institutes focused on Science Gateways [2] and Molecular Sciences 
[3], the Department of Energy’s Energy Science Network [4], and 
the NSF Pilot Study for Cyberinfrastructure Center of Excellence 
[5]. Over the past seven years, Trusted CI has impacted over 250 
NSF projects across all seven NSF science directorates [6], helping 
to secure our nation’s scientific cyberinfrastructure (CI) while 
tailoring cybersecurity to best support scientific missions. 
The article describes experiences both in terms of what Trusted 
CI has learned about cybersecurity for open science and in 
managing the process of providing centralized services to a broad 
and diverse community. The former experiences are broadly 
applicable to science projects and the latter experiences are relevant 
to other organizations following a similar model of providing 
focused expertise to the open science community. 
The article is organized as follows. We begin with the history of 
Trusted CI, accompanied by a description of the services it 
provides. We follow with this article’s main contributions: our 
lessons learned. We continue with a summary of our future vision 
for the Center. We conclude with related work and 
acknowledgments. 
HISTORY OF TRUSTED CI 
In this Section we provide a brief history of Trusted CI and a 
summary of its interactions with the US open science community. 
Subsequent sections provide an analysis of Trusted CI’s 
experiences. 
The genesis of Trusted CI is a series of two Scientific Software 
Security Innovation Institute (S3I2) workshops. The S3I2 
workshops, held in 2010 [7] and 2011 [8], included representatives 
of 35 major NSF-funded projects. The original goal of the 
workshops was to explore a software institute focused on 
cybersecurity for the NSF community. One finding from the 
workshops was that the NSF community faces strong challenges in 
obtaining access to cybersecurity expertise. Projects are forced to 
divert their resources to develop that expertise, with the result that 
they address risks haphazardly, unknowingly reinvent basic 
cybersecurity solutions, and struggle with interoperability. The 
workshops further determined that the need for access to expertise 
was more critical than any new software product. 
Based on the finding of the S3I2 workshops, the workshop 
organizers submitted an unsolicited proposal to NSF to create the 
Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC). 
This proposal was funded in 2012, initiating the project that would 
eventually become Trusted CI and which we will refer to in this 
paper as Trusted CI for simplicity. The main role of Trusted CI was 
to provide cybersecurity expertise to the NSF community. The form 
of this expertise is described in the following section, but includes 
engaging with 41 NSF projects, including 9 Large Facilities [9], to 
aid with cybersecurity challenges; providing cybersecurity training 
to nearly 300 NSF CI professionals from over 60 projects; and 
organizing and leading an annual summit to build community and 
share knowledge in tackling NSF cybersecurity challenges.  
In 2015, NSF released a solicitation for a new program, 
Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure (CICI), which 
included a call for an NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 
(CCoE). The Trusted CI team proposed continued funding for 
Trusted CI with the NSF CCoE designation and were awarded the 
designation and three more years of funding (2016-18) from NSF. 
Since 2016, Trusted CI, with the NSF CCoE designation, has 
continued serving the NSF community by convening a working 
group of leaders from the open science community to develop an 
Open Science Cyber Risk Profile (in collaboration with ESnet); 
initiating a Situational Awareness service for the NSF community 
to inform them of security vulnerabilities and the specific impact 
on NSF cyberinfrastructure; hosting the annual 100+ attendee NSF 
Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure; 
launching a monthly webinar series covering cybersecurity topics 
of interest to the NSF community with an average of 30 attendees 
per event and two thousand subsequent viewings of recordings; 
providing highly-rated training sessions on cybersecurity topics 
including identity management, log analysis, secure coding, and 
related topics at the NSF Cybersecurity Summit, XSEDE, 
Supercomputing, Indiana University, the Internet2 Technology 
Exchange, and the eResearch Australasia Conference; and 
partnering with the newly launched Science Gateways Community 
Institute (SGCI) to fund half of a security analyst focused on 
science gateway security. Additional partnerships established to 
ensure a coherent CI ecosystem included ESnet, Science Gateway 
Community Institute (SGCI), the Bro Center of Expertise, the 
Research Security Operations Center, Internet2, InCommon, the 
National Science Foundation Large Facilities Office, the NSF Pilot 
Study for Cyberinfrastructure Center of Excellence, the 
Engagement and Performance Operations Center (EPOC), GÉANT 
Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration, 
the WISE community, and various federal agencies and 
commercial sector organizations. 
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In 2019, Trusted CI continued operation via a one-year 
extension, and the Trusted CI team submitted a five-year proposal 
in response to a NSF CICI solicitation to continue as the NSF CCoE 
through 2024. Our five-year vision is to realize an “NSF 
cybersecurity ecosystem, formed of people, practical knowledge, 
processes, and cyberinfrastructure, that enables the NSF 
community to both manage cybersecurity risks and produce 
trustworthy science in support of NSF’s vision of a nation that is 
the global leader in research and innovation” [10]. We provide 
more details about our vision and strategic plan in the “Vision for 
the Future” section. 
TRUSTED CI MODEL FOR EXPERTISE 
Compared to the status quo before Trusted CI, in which each 
NSF project was responsible for obtaining and developing their 
own cybersecurity expertise, we find that Trusted CI is effective at 
providing value to the NSF open science community due to the 
following factors. 
A limited cybersecurity workforce. The workforce for 
cybersecurity in general is stretched thin [11], and science projects 
are challenged to find cybersecurity talent, particularly talent that 
is also familiar with scientific computing. A Department of Energy 
Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee Workforce 
Subcommittee has documented the challenges in finding qualified 
workforce across a range of computing skills, including 
cybersecurity [12]. 
Limited ability of smaller projects to hire specialized 
personnel. A study of cybersecurity budgets [13] at Department of 
Energy labs found that while there is some variance, their 
cybersecurity budgets are around 0.5% of their total budget and 
about 10% of their IT budget. Smaller projects will have a tension 
if their number of personnel is so small that these percentages no 
longer translate into full-time or meaningfully fractional part-time 
employees. The same study found percentages increased as project 
size decreased, perhaps in response to this tension, but typically 
small projects need to choose between a specialized cybersecurity 
position and a more general IT professional. 
Sharing Experiences. Even when individual projects can find 
and retain cybersecurity talent, each would only be tackling its slice 
of the science cybersecurity challenge. The complicated open 
science ecosystem brings significant challenges in cross-project 
collaborations and knowledge dissemination. Hard lessons learned 
by a project are shared haphazardly between projects, if at all. 
Additionally, important institutional knowledge is often lost when 
a project is completed, or when key personnel leave the community. 
 
Taken together, these factors combine to lead each open science 
project to tackle cybersecurity independently, resulting in 
duplicated mistakes, multiple implementations for security services 
(e.g., authentication systems) that do not interoperate, and negative 
impact on the productivity of science by confounding the goals of 
scientific collaboration, data stewardship, and dissemination of 
research results. 
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
We now discuss the experiences of Trusted CI along with the 
lessons learned related to those experiences, both with regards to 
cybersecurity for open science, and with regards to operating a 
center of expertise for open science. 
Engagements 
The NSF CICI solicitation in 2015 [14], which funded Trusted 
CI, called for a Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE) to 
conduct security audits and design reviews. We have been 
conducting such activities for the past seven years as Trusted CI 
“engagements.” Engagements are collaborations between Trusted 
CI and another project, focused on addressing a cybersecurity 
challenge of that project. Possible engagement foci include audits 
and reviews, but can also include: developing a risk-based 
cybersecurity plan (DKIST, GenApp, LSST, NEO, TransPAC), 
reviewing existing plans (Array of Things, CC-NIE projects, 
DataONE, Design Safe, Environmental Data Initiative, Gemini 
Observatory, HUBzero, IceCube, LNO, NRAO, USAP), making 
recommendations on software security features (Pegasus, SAGE2, 
SciGaP, Wildbook), and reviewing software at the code 
(perfSONAR, Singularity) or architectural level (Globus, 
HTCondor-CE). Descriptions of our engagements, including 
impact statements, can be found in our annual reports [15]. 
 
Lessons learned operating a Center of Expertise 
Importance of engagement planning. Before undertaking the 
technical work involved in a collaboration, Trusted CI develops an 
engagement plan in consultation with the engaged project. This 
document has proven invaluable in ensuring the scope, timeline, 
committed resources, and outcomes are well understood by both 
parties. We have found conducting engagements is non-trivial, 
requiring acumen beyond cybersecurity. 
Engagements require flexibility and innovation. The exact 
format of engagements needs to vary depending on the project’s 
culture, goals, challenge, and lifecycle stage. We have learned to 
innovate and be flexible regarding engagements, experimenting to 
find ways of making them more efficient. Examples of this 
innovation include: the introduction of a brief “cybercheckup” at 
the start of an engagement to evaluate a project’s existing 
cybersecurity program and identify which aspects would benefit 
most from attention; experimenting with a direct peer-to-peer 
review between projects that ultimately allows for scale beyond 
what is possible for Trusted CI to do directly; and ongoing low-
effort consulting for newly started projects making a series of 
design decisions for which they need quick feedback with regards 
to cybersecurity. 
Tension of sharing. Trusted CI aims for as broad an impact as 
possible by sharing the work products of its engagements with the 
whole NSF CI community. However, projects are sometimes 
reluctant to share cybersecurity-related information about their 
project. In these cases, Trusted CI publishes a short summary report 
of the engagement, while the engaged project receives a complete 
report containing potentially sensitive details. We have also had 
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some success with the paradigm of developing a project-neutral 
template to address a relevant cybersecurity issue and then using 
that to complete the engagement objectives with a project. A 
template, while not a complete replacement for an actual 
cybersecurity plan, does serve as a valuable, easily shared resource. 
Be prepared for delays. Even when a project and engagement 
approach are well understood, unexpected events (e.g., events that 
require the engaged project to re-prioritize temporarily) require 
flexibility in managing the engagement. To adapt to unexpected 
events, we recognize that our engagement teams will sometimes 
have spare effort due to being blocked, as well as the occasional 
need for additional effort. To allow for flexibility, Trusted CI 
maintains an ongoing task to develop training materials, best 
practices, and other deliverables with flexible deadlines. This 
allows staff to be applied to or from those deliverables and time-
sensitive engagement tasks.  
Repeated providing of services allows for refinement. A 
center of expertise interacts directly with dozens of projects and 
undertakes similar activities multiple times, something staff 
embedded in projects would not be able to do without changing 
positions. This allows Trusted CI staff to experiment and refine 
those processes. We find engagements are of critical importance as 
they give us direct and in-depth experience with the challenges 
facing NSF projects. However, they are labor intensive, consuming 
much of Trusted CI’s resources. Hence, we will continue to mature 
our engagement methodologies to allow us to perform engagements 
more efficiently. For example, Trusted CI’s Guide to Developing 
Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science and Engineering Projects 
[16] includes over 16 related templates, tools, and resources, and 
supports NSF CI projects in efficiently building a cybersecurity 
program to comply with the NSF Cooperative Terms and 
Conditions for Major Research Equipment and Facilities 
Construction (MREFC). We developed the Guide as part of our 
engagement with DKIST, and it was subsequently demonstrated by 
LSST to be an effective tool for developing a cybersecurity 
program.  
Engagement impact metrics. We continue to wrestle with 
appropriate impact metrics for the engagements. We ask engaged 
projects to complete a questionnaire at the end of each engagement 
rating the impact on their project’s cybersecurity, including how 
Trusted CI’s assistance compares with other cybersecurity services 
they may have used. We also follow-up periodically with engaged 
projects to evaluate impact over time, i.e., after they have 
implemented Trusted CI recommendations. 
Engagement red flags in terms of lasting impact. Trusted CI 
has begun to discern factors that may prevent an engagement from 
having a deep, sustained impact. Some such factors include the 
following. 
• Project management fails to agree and commit to an 
engagement plan. We have found a lack of strong 
commitment by management to be enough of a problem that 
we will no longer begin an engagement without a mutually 
agreed-to plan. 
• The project has strongly competing priorities. While 
Trusted CI recognizes projects typically have other tasks 
they are focused on during an engagement, there are times 
during a project lifecycle during which the potential for 
distraction, and hence a lack of participation in an 
engagement, is increased (e.g., immediately before an 
initial release). Trusted CI tries to discern this risk and 
manage it appropriately, e.g., by focusing tightly or 
delaying an engagement. 
• The project lacks application of basic cybersecurity 
hygiene. While it is true that scientific projects have unusual 
risks that basic cybersecurity practices do not address well, 
Trusted CI has determined that applying such basic 
hygiene, e.g., the SANS Critical Security Controls [17], is 
a good foundation for nearly any project that has some 
commodity IT infrastructure. Trusted CI considers if a 
project applying for an engagement has applied a base 
hygiene program and either suggests it as a predicate to the 
engagement or the goal of an initially tightly-focused 
engagement.  
Lessons regarding Cybersecurity for Open Science 
Management support is critical. A lack of dedicated resources 
and/or cybersecurity budget was a problem seen by Trusted CI on 
numerous occasions and often meant a project was unable to 
implement any of Trusted CI’s recommendations. While Trusted 
CI does not have a firm minimum metric for resources, we began 
asking about cybersecurity budgets on engagement applications. 
Standard security controls are still important. Open science 
projects rely on a fair amount of standard IT. These projects use 
email, web browsers, web servers, commodity file sharing, etc., to 
support their science mission. Common cybersecurity practices 
(e.g., Securing Commodity IT in Scientific CI Projects: Baseline 
Controls and Best Practices [18]) work for such IT, and projects 
should not spend effort re-inventing the wheel. 
Risk-based cybersecurity is needed for specialized scientific 
IT. Some IT infrastructure used in support of open science is very 
uncommon and even unique. Defined practices for cybersecurity 
do not exist for such IT and development of practices through risk 
management is necessary. Risk management is time-consuming 
and takes expertise. Projects are well served to apply standard 
practices to the greatest extent they can and then prioritize their 
application of risk management. Trusted CI’s Open Science Cyber 
Risk Profile (OSCRP) [19] provides tools for assessing risks for 
scientific assets. 
COMMUNITY BUILDING 
One of our goals has been to build a community of individuals 
in NSF projects and supporting organizations who practice 
cybersecurity to share their experiences, to support each other, and 
to sustain our work in the event our funding were to end. 
We initially attempted to develop an online community using a 
commercially-hosted web-based service. However, adoption and 
use by the community lagged and we decided the cost of the service 
was not merited. We migrated the community over to email lists, 
which have seen at least as much usage without cost to Trusted CI. 
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In 2013, Trusted CI re-launched the annual NSF cybersecurity 
summits after a five-year hiatus. We have continued to organize 
successful summits for the CI community on a yearly basis, 
including the introduction of a highly successful Call for 
Participation process in 2014 to facilitate greater community 
involvement with the event. 
The annual cybersecurity summits provide the community with 
a valuable opportunity to share best practices, attend practical 
training sessions, and collaborate on solving common challenges 
regarding securing NSF-funded facilities and projects. Community 
evaluations have been overwhelmingly positive. 
The summits have become an increasingly important event for 
Trusted CI development as well. The interaction with the 
community helps Trusted CI to make new relationships and 
cultivate opportunities for collaboration with large facilities and 
projects. Additionally, the knowledge gained from past 
engagements is communicated at the annual summit, amplifying 
the impact of the work to the larger community.  
In 2016, we started a series of monthly webinars. Initially the 
content was provided by Trusted CI staff, but it has since expanded 
to include members of the community. Attendance has grown and 
has averaged 40 attendees viewing the event live each month, with 
another 60 viewings of the archives. 
Lessons learned operating a Center of Expertise 
Email lists worked at least as well as web-based services for 
building community. Early in the project, we attempted to use a 
web-based platform to foster community with little success and 
subsequently shifted to email lists. We speculate that our 
community is accustomed to using email and in retrospect we 
should have started with email lists. 
Webinars are an effective way to share expertise. The 
webinars were successful both in terms of attendance and in terms 
of members of the community being willing to present their 
material. Archival of webinars has built a library of over 30 videos 
on cybersecurity-related issues. 
The summit has been useful in building a client base. By 
fostering interaction with dozens of projects each year, the summit 
allows Trusted CI to disseminate information about itself and its 
successes, as well as interact with the community to better 
understand requirements. Initial contact with many clients has been 
made through the summit since its inception. 
Summit attendance by NSF staff provides valuable 
interactions. Until 2019, Trusted CI held its Summit proximate to 
NSF (walking distance) to encourage presentation and participation 
by NSF program officers from a variety of NSF directorates. Like 
the community interactions, interactions with program officers 
allow for dissemination of knowledge about Trusted CI and a 
chance for Trusted CI to understand community requirements. It 
also gives other Summit attendees an opportunity to interact with 
their program officers and discuss cybersecurity topics with them 
face-to-face. However, we have seen declining Summit 
participation from NSF staff in recent years and increasing costs in 
the DC area, so we will be experimenting with other Summit 
locations starting in 2019. Participation in NSF Principal 
Investigator (PI) meetings and other NSF-organized meetings (such 
as the NSF Large Facilities Workshop) has provided additional 
opportunities for NSF staff interactions. 
Venues for delivering training are scarce. There are few 
venues that offer opportunities either to provide or receive 
cybersecurity training targeted at the needs of our community. 
Many venues face a challenge in making time for specialized topics 
such as cybersecurity. While Trusted CI has had some success with 
the PEARC, SC, and XSEDE conferences (primarily with training 
on secure coding), the Summit remains the main venue for Trusted 
CI to deliver training. The training at the Summit and other venues 
has been well received, e.g., 36 of 38 respondents to the 2018 
Summit survey answered “yes” when asked if they would 
participate in future summit training sessions [20]. This leads to the 
consideration that an event for delivering training to CI 
professionals by Trusted CI and other projects across a range of 
specialized topics (e.g., data management, software engineering) 
could be well received by the community. 
Lessons regarding Cybersecurity for Open Science 
Projects are reticent to discuss cybersecurity incidents. Often 
based in embarrassment or reputational concern, projects will 
initially be unwilling to share experiences regarding their 
cybersecurity incidents. Over the years, we’ve seen some erosion 
of this reticence with sharing of incident experiences [21], but it 
takes time for the community members to build trust in the 
community. Education of the community that cybersecurity 
incidents should not be held against them is also beneficial. 
Other Lessons Learned 
Challenge of commodity IT and underlying organizations. 
Every NSF cyberinfrastructure project we have worked with is 
embedded in and leverages varying degrees of the commodity IT 
infrastructure, cybersecurity infrastructure, and cybersecurity 
policies of the university or organization that hosts them. Trusted 
CI is working on best practices that cover these topics to allow 
Trusted CI (and other NSF CI projects) to reasonably include them 
in an assessment and cybersecurity plan without undue effort. 
Cyberinfrastructure has unique security challenges. In 
applying best practices from the broader cybersecurity community 
(e.g., NIST), Trusted CI continues to identify challenges specific to 
NSF CI, from unique assets such as scientific data and instruments, 
to challenges such as a close relationship to institutions of higher 
education and research. CI has a unique threat model, which led to 
the development of Trusted CI’s Open Science Cyber Risk Profile 
(OSCRP). Additionally, Trusted CI’s Guide to Developing 
Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science and Engineering Projects 
provides guidance for addressing challenges unique to NSF CI. 
Strong community ties, operational security expertise, and 
diverse backgrounds are critical to success. Since its inception, 
the Trusted CI team has represented a wealth of operational security 
experience, strong connections to NSF and other major science 
projects, and a variety of practical experiences in related domains 
(e.g., law, risk management) and communities (e.g., software 
development, scientific, military, corporate, and government). 
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These differing connections and backgrounds have proven 
invaluable in being able to initiate and establish the relationships 
needed to form engagements with diverse scientific communities 
represented by different NSF projects, as well as bring broader 
information security best practices to bear. 
Leverage campus resources and expertise when possible. As 
we described previously, every NSF CI project with which we have 
worked is embedded in and leverages varying degrees of the 
commodity IT infrastructure, cybersecurity infrastructure, and 
cybersecurity policies of the university or organization that hosts it. 
Trusted CI has been working to answer questions regarding the 
degree and circumstances in which projects can leverage existing 
campus policy and infrastructure. While still not completely 
understood, some facets of the answers are starting to emerge. 
• Commodity services such as vulnerability scanning and 
licenses for static analysis tools are sufficiently generic 
to be readily used by projects. 
• Campus security offices tend to understand compliance-
based security, so a project with HIPAA-covered data or 
social security numbers will likely find policies or 
infrastructure they can leverage. 
• Due in part to the NSF CC-NIE/IIE program, networks 
tuned for science (e.g., Science DMZs) are increasingly 
available and may be of benefit to projects with large data 
movement needs. 
• In general, campuses are not well positioned to provide 
comprehensive information security plans and programs 
for complex, large scale, and often multi-institutional 
science projects. 
RELATED WORK 
A crucial goal for Trusted CI is establishing trust and 
interoperability not only within the NSF community but also with 
collaborating communities. We seek both to leverage best practices 
from the broader community as well as to disseminate innovations 
from Trusted CI and the NSF community. Hence, we have 
established relationships with communities outside of our key NSF 
constituency to ensure the success of Trusted CI as a CCoE. 
• Department of Energy (DOE): We are well connected 
with the open science community in DOE through the 
Energy Science network (ESnet). We collaborate with 
ESnet on projects with a Science DMZ component and 
on development of the Open Science Cyber Risk Profile 
(OSCRP) [19]. In 2019, Sean Peisert joined the Trusted 
CI team from Berkeley Lab to further strengthen this 
relationship. 
• Science Gateway Community Institute (SGCI): Through 
SGCI’s Incubator program, Trusted CI offers specialized 
engagements, or consultations, to science gateway 
developers and operators seeking cybersecurity support. 
Additionally, Trusted CI presents on relevant 
cybersecurity topics during SGCI’s “bootcamps.” 
• Bro Center of Expertise: As another large cybersecurity-
related project funded by the NSF Office of Advanced 
Cyberinfrastructure (OAC), collaboration between 
Trusted CI and the Bro Center was natural. We 
collaborated on training at the NSF Cybersecurity 
Summits, engaged with NSF communities with large 
networking or Bro deployments, and developed 
documentation and materials, until the Bro Center ended 
operation in 2018. 
• Research Security Operations Center (ResearchSOC): 
The ResearchSOC, launched in 2018, also under other 
funding from NSF OAC, provides operational services to 
the research community. Trusted CI and the 
ResearchSOC share leadership and coordinate to provide 
the NSF community with comprehensive cybersecurity 
leadership and resources.  
• Higher Education, Internet2 and InCommon: The NSF 
Campus Cyberinfrastructure programs demonstrate the 
continued growth in the portfolio of research support 
services on campuses, together with the importance of 
securely connecting campus CI with regional, national, 
and international CI. Internet2 and InCommon provide a 
core research network and identity services to campuses 
and bring the community together to establish standards 
and share lessons learned. Trusted CI’s representation 
within InCommon leadership (e.g., InCommon Steering 
Committee and InCommon Technical Advisory 
Committee) helps to ensure Trusted CI’s continued 
positive impact in this community, building on prior 
work (e.g., [22]). In 2019, Dana Brunson joined both 
Internet2 and the Trusted CI team to further strengthen 
this relationship. 
• National Science Foundation (NSF): We have learned 
there is great value in engaging directly with NSF. We 
are working closely with the Large Facilities Office to 
produce cybersecurity guidelines for a future revision of 
the Major Facilities Guide that is influenced by Trusted 
CI’s cybersecurity planning guide. We also engaged 
directly with the United States Antarctic Program, which 
directly operates CI at the Antarctic.  
• NSF Pilot Study for Cyberinfrastructure Center of 
Excellence: This nascent effort is striving to provide a 
center of expertise regarding CI broadly. Like SGCI, 
Trusted CI and the Pilot collaborate to offer cybersecurity 
through the Pilot’s activities. 
• Engagement and Performance Operations Center 
(EPOC): The center, established in 2018, is a production 
platform for operations, applied training, monitoring, and 
research and education support. 
• International Science: Our partnership with the GÉANT 
Authentication and Authorisation for Research and 
Collaboration (AARC) project enables EU-US 
coordination on federated identities for international 
science. Neil Chue Hong, director of the UK Software 
Sustainability Institute, serves on our advisory 
committee, giving us a persistent liaison to science 
outside of the US. In 2017 and 2018 Trusted CI hosted 
workshops for the Wise Information Security for 
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collaborating E-infrastructures (WISE) community. 
WISE is an international community with participants 
from North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia. 
• Other federal agencies and the commercial sector: 
Through a small number of selected invitations to the 
annual Cybersecurity Summit, we maintain awareness of 
other federal agencies and activities in the private sector, 
as well as allow for the dissemination of our work. 
Several members of Trusted CI management also serve 
as PIs on DOE and DHS projects. 
VISION FOR THE FUTURE 
The NSF community is large and diverse, encompassing NSF 
itself, its seven science directorates, over two dozen Large 
Facilities, and tens of thousands of smaller ephemeral projects. This 
community is tightly integrated with the higher education 
institutions and research laboratories that provide administrative 
homes for projects. The community also collaborates closely with 
communities from other federal and non-federal agencies, as well 
as with the international science community. 
The diversity of these projects’ science missions, combined with 
the complexities of implementing cybersecurity and open science 
in tandem, creates a serious cybersecurity challenge. There is no 
off-the-shelf approach to cybersecurity for open science that the 
NSF community can adopt. Even Large Facilities, the largest of the 
NSF projects, struggle to develop tailored approaches. 
To address this challenge, an approach is needed to manage risks, 
while providing both flexibility for project-specific adaptations and 
access to the necessary knowledge and human resources for 
implementation. Hence, the Trusted CI vision is for an “NSF 
cybersecurity ecosystem, formed of people, practical knowledge, 
processes, and cyberinfrastructure, that enables the NSF 
community to both manage cybersecurity risks and produce 
trustworthy science in support of NSF’s vision of a nation that is 
the global leader in research and innovation.” 
Trusted CI has primary responsibility for bringing the vision for 
an NSF cybersecurity ecosystem to fruition. Hence, the “mission of 
Trusted CI is to lead in the development of an NSF cybersecurity 
ecosystem with the workforce, knowledge, processes, and 
cyberinfrastructure that enables trustworthy science and NSF’s 
vision of a nation that is a global leader in research and innovation.” 
To accomplish this mission, we organize the future activities of 
Trusted CI under a set of strategic objectives as follows. 
Build and Disseminate the Needed Knowledge. Trusted CI 
will develop and support the adoption of an NSF cybersecurity 
framework that addresses unique community needs while relating 
to other broadly known programs such as the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework [23] and NIST 800-171 [24]. Trusted CI will be 
aggressive in evangelizing to projects about the NSF cybersecurity 
framework, related cybersecurity resources, and workforce 
development opportunities. Additionally, Trusted CI will continue 
to organize the annual NSF Cybersecurity Summit, online 
discussions, and communication forums to continue to mature and 
grow the community. In these efforts, Trusted CI will continue to 
espouse a flexible approach to cybersecurity, which balances 
baseline practices with risk management emphasizing the mission 
of scientific research. 
Sustain the Community. Trusted CI will continue to improve 
its delivery of NSF- and project-funded engagements to most 
effectively and efficiently meet the needs of the NSF community. 
It will also continue to explore Engagements funded by projects as 
a means of achieving the goal of financial sustainability. Trusted 
CI will lead the definition and tracking of cybersecurity community 
metrics to: 1) measure the impact of Trusted CI; 2) enable 
community members to benchmark their efforts in relation to the 
cybersecurity efforts of other community members; and 3) 
demonstrate the maturation of the NSF cybersecurity ecosystem 
over time. 
Secure Cyberinfrastructure. Trusted CI will improve the 
security of NSF cyberinfrastructure by developing secure software 
engineering and secure coding practices. It will also build a national 
community around cybersecurity for research by coordinating 
events that build trust across NSF and collaborating organizations 
both nationally (e.g., Department of Energy, National Institutes of 
Health) and internationally (e.g., Large Hadron Collider, Square 
Kilometer Array, Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave 
Observatory). 
Foster the Workforce and Collaborations. Trusted CI will 
continue to provide high-quality training for the NSF community 
and will continue efforts to make students and non-NSF 
professionals aware of the NSF cybersecurity ecosystem and the 
opportunities to work in cybersecurity and to enable science, an 
exciting combination. Trusted CI will also continue work to 
increase the representation of minorities and underrepresented 
groups in the NSF cybersecurity ecosystem, whose demographics 
at NSF Cybersecurity Summits indicate a white male majority, to 
further bolster the workforce. Trusted CI will continue outreach to 
higher education information security officers and research 
facilitators to enable them to help NSF projects with cybersecurity 
challenges. 
As part of realizing this vision, Trusted CI has launched two new 
activities in 2019. Trusted CI established a fellowship program to 
further address the scaling challenge of impacting the tens of 
thousands of NSF funded projects, and Trusted CI established a 
transition to practice (TTP) program to foster the transition of NSF-
funded cybersecurity research and development into practice in the 
NSF community and convey unmet cybersecurity requirements 
back to the research and development communities as targets for 
future research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The experience we have gained while operating Trusted CI since 
2012 has helped us develop effective methods of addressing 
cybersecurity for open science. As the NSF Cybersecurity Center 
of Excellence, Trusted CI is a model for providing national-scale 
expertise to the scientific community, working collaboratively with 
science projects to fill gaps and disseminate knowledge via 
training, consulting, webinars, summits, and email lists. We hope 
the experiences and lessons learned presented here are helpful to 
organizations that are providing support for cybersecurity or other 
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focused topic areas (e.g., software engineering, high performance 
networking, etc.) to the scientific community.  
For additional Trusted CI resources, visit https://trustedci.org/.  
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